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RECENT CASES

one-half share of the community property after his death, leaving the wife one-half of
the proceeds as her share of the community property. This is the California rule.
Beemer v. Roher, 137 Cal. App. 293, 30 P.2d 547 (1934). Senate Bill No. 176
in the 1953 session of the Washington Legislature provided this solution as an amendment to RCW 26.16.030 [RRS §6891]. The bill passed the Senate but died in the
House Judiciary Committee as the session ended. LEG. REc. No. 8, 33rd Sess. 25 (1953).
RCW 26.16.030 ERRS §6891] provides that a husband may devise by will onehalf of the personal community property. Allowing the spouse to designate a beneficiary that will take one-half of the insurance payments would seem to be the most
just workable and logically consistent solution to present unsettled state of Washington law.
DALE RIVELAND

Evidence-Patient Physician Privilege-Waiver of Privilege to One Physician as
Waiver to other Physician - Waiver by Patient's own Tesitmony. P sought recovery for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During trial P introduced
three physicians who testified that P had suffered disability in his right arm involving weakness, numbness, and difficulty of movement.P lumself took the stand and
testified that the injuries described by his doctors resulted from the accident and
that, prior to the accident, he had not consulted a doctor for "years." The jury returned a verdict for P for $21,000. The trial court granted D a new trial on the issue
of damages because of newly discovered evidence consisting of another physician who
would testify that during the four years preceeding the accident he treated the P a total
of twenty times for such ailments as contusions, rheumatic condition, and neuritis all
in the right shoulder. Held: Waiver of privileges as to one physician is a waiver to
all other physicians; order for new trial affirmed. McUne v. Puqua, 142 Wash. Dec.

60, 253 P.2d 632 (1953).
The problem presented by this case is the extent of the patient-physician privilege
under RCW 5.60.060 (4) ERRS 1214 (4)] in civil actions involving as a material issue the physical condition of a party to the action. The statute as presently construed
by the Washington court presents a blanket prohibition unless by some action express
or implied the court finds that there is a waiver. Williatms v. Spokane Falls & Northern
Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 597, 84 Pac. 1129 (1906); In re Quick's Estate, 161 Wash. 537,
297 Pac. 198 (1931). The holding of the principal case adopts what is probably the
numerical minority position as to the extent 6f a waiver in a case involving the testimony of physicians who acquired their information independently of one another, not
in consultation nor at the same time. In following the minority position the Washington Court has clearly arrived at the better reasoned rule. If the patient wishes to keep
his secret from the ears of his neighbors he should not have brought in the first doctor. The first testimony presumably having brought out the complete medical history
of the patient as regards the injuries in controversy the patient should have nothing to
fear from the testimony of the second physician.
The facts of the principal case are distinguishable from the case of In re Quick's
Estate, supra, because the Quick opinion does not disclose whether or not the two
doctors attended the patient in consultation. If so, the testimony would almost umversally be admissible.
The language used by the court in the principal case is much broader than the actual
holding. Quoting from the case of Roeser v. Pease,37 Okla. 222, 228; 131 Pac. 534, 537
(1913) the court said. '. . . If she [plaintiff] can go upon the witness stand and
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testify that she had not suffered from these afflictions prior to the accident, and then
prevent the only available impeaching testimony from being disclosed, by a claim of
privilege, it would seem that a mockery is being made of justice, and we do not think
our statute contemplates such a condition
" This expression, if it represents the
new attitude of the court toward the statute, calls for a re-appraisal of the case of
Neolle v. Hoqutam. Lumber & Shingle Co., 47 Wash. 519, 92 Pac.372 (1907). Cf.
Wesseler v. Great Northern R. Co., 90 Wash. 234, 157 Pac. 461 (1916). In the Noelle
case the court held that where the P takes the stand and describes his injuries as to
their cause and extent, he does not waive the privilege as to any physician who attnded him for such alleged injuries. The danger in this type of situation is that a naked
fraud may be perpetrated under the guise of legality. As was forcefully stated by
Judge Root in the dissenting opinion in the Neolle case, the secrets of the sick room
having been voluntarily exposed by the P, the reason for the privilege no longer
obtains. Invoking the privilege at this stage of the proceedings is to use the privilege
"as a sword instead of as a shield." Professor Wigmore has this comment to make:
"Certainly it is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for the chicanery of the law when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a crowded court
room the details of his supposed ailment, and then neatly suppresses the available proof
of his falsities by wielding a weapon nominally termed a privilege." 8 WxIMoaE, EvIDENCE § 2389 3rd ed. (1940). The language of the principal case indicates that the
Washington court is beginning to take cognizance of the realities of the situation.
The patient-physician privilege, if not strictly confined, results in an unwarranted obstruction to the attainment of substantial justice. P comes into court seeking to recover damages for personal injuries, yet the amount of damages that can properly be
awarded is dependent upon Ps physical condition both prior and subsequent to the accident.
Some jurisdictions, notably New York, have approached a satisfactory solution.
Examples are Heithser v. Johns, 233 N.Y. 370, 135 N.E. 603 (1922), holding testimony of plaintiff alone as to his physical condition and past medical treatment may
waive the privilege and Apter v. Home Life Insurance Co., 266 N.Y. 333, 194 N.E.
846 (1935), holding that in action on a policy of disability insurance, defendant may
call plaintiff's physician to testify as to whether the disease originated or became evident prior to issuance of policy.
A more realistic solution is the method that has been tried and proved in California
of amending the statute itself. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., §1881 (Deenng 1948). See
Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines 28 Cal.2d 357, 170 P.2d 465 (1946).
If the Washington statute could be similarly amended it would be a long overdue
legislative advancement. Such an amendment could be to the effect that where any
person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries or brings any civil
action where his or her physical condition is materially in issue, such action shall be
deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any physician
who has prescribed for, treated or examined said person and whose testimony is material shall be competent to testify.
JAmEs F McATaa

Evidence-Cross Examination of Defendant's Character Witnesses--Scope. D was
convicted of second degree burglary. During the cross examination of three character
witnesses for the defense, the prosecuting attorney asked, over the objections of the
defense, the following questions: "Did you know that in 1941 D had is operator's

